Mogadishu,Somalia :: 10 February, 2010 The plantation system began in 1919, with the arrival in Somalia of Prince Luigi Amedeo of Savoy, Duke of Abruzzi and with the technical support of the fascist administration of Governor Cesare Maria de Vecchi de Val Cismon . The Shabelle Valley was chosen as the site of these plantations because for most of the year the Shabelle river had sufficient water for irrigation. The plantations produced cotton (the first Somali export crop), sugar, and bananas.

Banana exports to Italy began in 1927, and gained primary importance in the colony after 1929, when the world cotton market collapsed. Somali bananas could not compete in price with those from the Canary Islands, but in 1927 and 1930 Italy passed laws imposing tariffs on all non-Somali bananas. These laws facilitated Somali agricultural development so that between 1929 and 1936 the area under banana cultivation increased seventeenfold to 39.75 km². By 1935 the Italian government had constituted a Royal Banana Plantation Monopoly (Regia Azienda Monopolio Banane--RAMP) to organize banana exports under state authority.

Seven Italian ships were put at RAMB's disposal to encourage the Somali banana trade. After World War when the United Nations granted republican Italy jurisdiction over Somalia as a trust territory, RAMB was reconstituted as the Banana Plantation Monopoly (Azienda Monopolio Banane—RAMP)  to encourage the revival of a sector that had been nearly demolished by the war.

Plantation agriculture under Italian tutelage had short-term success, but Somali products never became internationally competitive. In 1955 a total of 235 concessions embraced more than 453 km² (with only 74 km² devoted to bananas), and produced 94,000 tons of bananas. Under fixed contracts, the three banana trade associations sold their output to the AMB, which exacted an indirect tax on the Italian consumer by keeping out cheaper bananas from other sources. The protected Italian market was a mixed blessing for the Somali banana sector. Whereas it made possible the initial penetration by Somali bananas of the Italian marketplace, it also eliminated incentives for Somali producers to become internationally competitive or to seek markets beyond Italy.

There was however, no consistent growth. In 1953 exports dropped by two-thirds. Two reasons are given for cotton's failure as an export crop: an unstable world market and the lack of Somali wage labor for cotton harvesting. Because of the labor scarcity, Italian concessionaires worked out coparticipation contracts with Somali farmers; the Italians received sole purchasing rights to the crop in return for providing seed, cash advances, and technical support.

Another plantation crop, sugarcane, was more successful. The sugar economy differed from the banana and cotton economies in two respects: sugar was raised for domestic consumption, and a single firm, the Italo-Somali Agricultural Society (Societa Agricola Italo-Somala--SAIS), headquartered in Genoa, controlled the sector. Organized in 1920, the SAIS estate near Giohar had, by the time of the trust period, a little less than 20 km² under cultivation. In 1950 the sugar factory's output reached 4,000 tons, enough to meet about 80 percent of domestic demand; by 1957 production had reached 11,000 tons, and Italian Somaliland no longer imported sugar.

Somalia also received grants and loans from countries in the East and the West, which made possible the articulation of an ambitious development plan by 1963. A five-year plan with a budget of more than US$100 million in grants and loans, it focused on investment in infrastructure. The plan's thesis was that plantation crops and livestock exports would increase if there were better roads, transportation facilities, ports, and irrigation works. Another large investment was made in the creation of model farms to attract farmers from around the country, who would learn improved techniques to apply on their own farms. Model farms in Baidoa in the Bay Region , Afgooye near Mogadishu and Togwajaale west of Hargeysa were established during this period.

Apart from the above stated report, the National Association of Somali Science and Environmental Journalists (NASSEJ) is eagerly need to describe the current expectation on Somalia fertile land and how Somali people are now benefiting  their fertile and arable land.

For almost two decades Somalia has not had a central powerful government since the overthrow Siad Barre regime in 1991 and has had 18 regions so most of Somalia land is proper for planting.

The presence of the Juba and Shabelle rivers and their associated broad floods plains provide the highest potential for agricultural production. It’s also undeniable that climatic conditions and water availability greatly effected agriculture development in Somalia and this caused that the Somali farmers are probably more focused on minimizing the risk of failure than the increasing productivity.

The substantial agriculture development in Somalia is possible only along the Juba and Shabelle rivers.

Somali Farmers are receptive to new ideas and practices if there is information appropriately presented. If there is also frustration from frequent crop failures and food shortages has created a desire for alternative sustainable solutions that can prevent further erosion of livelihood security.

However, the local knowledge that Somalia farmers possess is a resource that can be utilized and can greatly assist researchers and development agencies to identify appropriate interventions that are likely to succeed in the harsh and semi-arid environment.

There is considerable scope for increasing the productivity of land at moment and under cultivation such in places where crop yields are typically low. The expansion of cultivated land may be limited by availability of irrigation water, a factor that will need to be taken into consideration to prevent the overexpansion of water reserves.

The farming households may find it difficult to introduce new techniques or utilize new and improved inputs for fear of failure or insufficient market opportunities.

Impact of Inappropriate Aid Interventions

In Somalia there are aid interventions that have had some limited impacts on the lives of many Somalis. The lack of consistency in food security approaches used by different agencies have some times been counter productive particularly where there is insufficient knowledge of local farming and production systems.

Food aid, particularly where food commodities are imported needs to be the targeted one and synchronized with local food production to minimize the risk of impacting negatively on farm gate prices and acting as a disincentive as well as discouraging farmers from planting crops during the subsequent cropping season.

For example are cases where the food aid continues to be delivered even after a good harvest.

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